Portland State University

PDXScholar
Student Research Symposium

Student Research Symposium 2015

May 12th, 2:45 PM - 4:15 PM

Locke, Figure, and Judgement: A Consistent Answer
to the Molyneux Problem
Jamale Nagi
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/studentsymposium
Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons, Developmental Psychology Commons, History of
Philosophy Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Nagi, Jamale, "Locke, Figure, and Judgement: A Consistent Answer to the Molyneux Problem" (2015).
Student Research Symposium. 6.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/studentsymposium/2015/Presentations/6

This Oral Presentation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Research Symposium by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this
document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

“Locke, Judgment, and Figure: A Consistent Answer to the Molyneux Problem”

Jamale Nagi
Portland State University
Undergraduate
jamale@pdx.edu

Introduction
Ever since Locke published the ‘Molyneux Problem,’ in his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1694), philosophical discussions surrounding it have touched on whether there
are innate cross-modal connections in the mind, with modalities conceived as the particular
senses of the body conveying ideas to the person from the environment. A cross-modal
connection is where representational content is shared by two or more sense modalities; or if the
mind is unimodal, then mental connections are thought to occur only after experience.
Rationalists have typically affirmed cross-modal connections in the mind, but empiricists have
denied such a possibility, maintaining that connections between the various modalities are made
only after a sufficient amount of experience has occurred. For his part, Locke, agreeing with
Molyneux, held the opinion that such connections could only be known for certain through
experience. Many have argued that Locke, by answering in the affirmative, has put a strain on
the consistency of his epistemology and philosophy of mind.1 I will show that it is within the
scope of Locke’s body of work for him to consistently maintain cross-modal connections are
another faculty of the mind, while the verification of that faculty’s representational content must
be empirically verified. I hope to achieve this by analyzing his notion and use of judgment, and
paying close attention to how his views on causation evolved throughout his career.
In order to tease out my interpretation of Locke, I will begin with a layout of the
Molyneux problem, providing a historical sketch, and note some early criticism. Next, I will
highlight the pertinent points in Locke’s philosophy, and then I will critically examine a recent
1
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paper by Ralph Schumacher, in which he claims that Locke’s use of judgment is untenable given
his empiricist epistemology and philosophy of mind. These taken together, I believe, provide the
means for a consistent answer to the Molyneux Problem.
A Historical Sketch
Irish scientist, William Molyneux (1656-1698), after reading the first edition of Locke’s
essay, wrote to him, sending his famous thought experiment. In it he inquired, whether a person
born blind, who could, by touch, distinguish the shape of a sphere from the shape of a cube,
would they be able, upon gaining their sight, distinguish the shapes without touching them?2
Molyneux answered his question by claiming that although the person has gained the experience
of these shapes by touch, they have yet to gain the experience of how their touch affects their
sight. In other words, according to Molyneux the cognitive mechanism needed to associate the
mental content gained from the modality of sight, with the content gained from touch is created
by experience. Conversely, if the identification were to be made upon sight, the cognitive
mechanism would be innate. Epistemically, this boils down to the prior claiming the distinction
can only be known through experience, while the latter claims it can be made known through
reason.
John Locke inserted Molyneux’s thought experiment in the second edition of the Essay,
where it remained through each subsequent edition. Locke agreed with Molyneux’s answer,
claiming that at first sight the person would not be able to say for certain which shape was
which, though they could name them by touch. Locke supports this claim by appealing to an act
2
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of judgment which through custom seems to convert the visual input of a two-dimensional figure
in to a three-dimensional figure.3
Bishop George Berkeley (1685 – 1753) was one of the first to insist the need to
abandon the doctrine of common sensibles in order to justify a negative answer. Descartes and
Locke were largely credited with rediscovering the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities from Aristotle, who had distinguished between common sensibles and proper
sensibles.4
Under the heading of common sensibles are qualities such as extension, figure, motion,
rest, and number. The proper sensibles, on the other hand, include the sensations of color, sound,
taste, and temperature. It is clear Locke is committed to this distinction when he lists extension,
figure, motion, and rest, as ideas we get from both seeing and feeling.5 With this in mind,
Berkeley objected, that if the figure of an object perceived by touch is the same figure perceived
by sight, then nothing new is introduced in one’s mind.6 That is to say, if there is a cross-modal
connection, at least relative to figure, then Locke and Molyneux are supposedly wrong.7
Consequently, Berkeley defended a heterogeneous thesis where ideas of sight are of a different
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kind than ideas of touch. Vision for Berkeley was like a language with an arbitrary connection
between the signs and what they stand in for.8
I propose that Locke held there are two ways of accessing the idea of three-dimensional
figure. One we receive from bodies through the relation of resemblance, and the other through
perceiving colors causally. The prior is a representation of figure as the genuine article, with the
latter just appearing as figure—which I will henceforth call zigure. In order to draw out this
distinction more needs to be said about Locke’s divide between ideas of primary and secondary
quality, and how they are conveyed to the mind.
Ideas of Primary and Secondary Quality
Locke distinguishes primary qualities as those that are inseparable from a body. Of the
primary qualities found in bodies, Locke lists: solidity, extension, figure, mobility, motion or
rest, number, bulk, texture, motion, size, and situation. Locke claims that such qualities are found
by the senses in every perceivable bulk of matter, and that the mind finds them in every
particular particle.9 This notion is attested by considering Locke’s example of the division of a
grain of wheat.10 Locke seeks to show that one can continue to divide an object conceptually,
even when one cannot physically divide it any longer, yet whatever remains will be conceived of
as having primary qualities.
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Locke describes secondary qualities as powers possessed by particular particles of
matter to bring about ideas in a perceiver.11 He holds secondary qualities as separable from
bodies, and as ones that do not resemble bodies as they are in-themselves. Michael Jacovides
explains, concluding from Locke’s wheat example, that although it can be known by reason that
the minute pieces of flour retain their primary qualities, none of the ideas of primary quality are
conveyed to perceivers. This is precisely because those bits of matter do not have powers to
produce ideas of primary qualities, or else they would be perceived.12 Secondary qualities, on the
other hand, are the powers of certain particles of matter that produce ideas in us. For example,
the idea of the whiteness of the flour is conveyed to us by particles, which possess primary
qualities, yet have the additional property of a power to bring about an idea of whiteness in a
perceiver. Locke says manna has, in addition to the primary qualities, the power to cause
sickness in us, but the sickness is not ‘in’ the manna, it is ‘in’ us.13 Consequently, Locke thinks
of secondary qualities as separable from bodies. Locke explicitly says ideas of secondary
qualities are not really ‘in’ the objects—like ideas of primary quality—but are features of an
object’s primary qualities.14
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Locke maintains ideas of secondary quality are only represented as effects of their causes
and this relationship is insufficient to represent ideas of primary quality—like figure. Thus Locke
chose the relation of resemblance to convey the representation of ideas of primary quality.
Representation by way of resemblance occurs in the mind as images.15 Jacovides explains that
the idea of figure is really an image of figure, and an image is any mental content you can draw a
picture of.16
Thomas Lennon commenting on Locke’s theory of representation, echoes Jacovides, in
maintaining that Locke denies that secondary qualities represent by resemblance as being crucial
for his advancing of the corpuscularian theory of substance.17 On the corpuscularian theory,
substances consist of primary qualities, such as figure, motion, size, etc., and secondary qualities
subsist on the primary ones. Lennon interprets Locke as holding that ideas of secondary quality,
like whiteness, represent, and accurately correspond to the unit(s) in the substructure of an
object, but not the structure of the object itself.18 Thus, Locke holds that particles of
imperceptible bulk, relative to the modalities of sight and touch, impinge on us in a causal
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relationship to convey ideas of secondary quality. These ideas are mere effects of their causes.
Ideas of primary quality, on the other hand, are conveyed by resemblance.
There are broadly two interpretations of how Locke might think primary qualities are
conveyed to the mind. Both interpretations agree that Locke comes to admit that the explanatory
scope of corpuscularian mechanism is limited in some fashion. The disagreement is whether this
limitation should be conceived of epistemically, or metaphysically. One major intersection of
contention, amongst others, comes from Locke’s letter to Stillingfleet. In it Locke backs away
from the claim that all bodies interact by impulse, but also remarks that he can yet conceive of
another way they could interact. Locke goes on to mention that he has been persuaded by
Newton’s Principia, not to presume to limit God’s power to put into bodies ‘powers and
operations’ beyond what we can explain by matter.19
For the purpose of this essay I am not daring to venture an account of how the connection
through resemblance is made. E. M. Curley has flatly stated Locke has no ‘general thesis’ of the
perception of primary qualities.20 It will suffice for my purposes that at least he holds they can be
conveyed, and in a different manner than the ideas secondary qualities are—whether ultimately
in some alternative causal manner, or by God’s active will.
On my interpretation, the idea of three-dimensional figure can be received two ways
simultaneously and coextensively with one another. First, two-dimensional figures are received
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causally via colors, which, through an act of judgment, appear as three-dimensional zigure.
While, through the relation of resemblance, figure is represented as the genuine article.
Consequently, Molyneux’s patient would have to touch the object to be certain whether the
figure perceived was not merely zigure. To further tease out this interpretation and in particular
how Locke, by positing two kinds figure, can maintain a passive judgment, and thereby remain
faithful to his empiricist predilections we will need to examine how he conceives of an act of
judgment.
Judgment for Locke
David Owen explains Locke’s view on judgment as analogous to his explanation of
knowledge.21 For Locke, knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement between
ideas.22 Locke lists four ways how ideas can agree or disagree: identity or diversity, relation, coexistence or necessary connection, and real existence. 23 Locke, then, offers three ways how these
agreements (or disagreements) are perceived: intuitively, by demonstration, or through the
senses.24 Locke gives the example of knowledge of our own existence by intuition, the existence
of God by demonstration, and of external things by sensation.25 Judgment follows the same
21
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course as knowledge, except for there is not a perception of an agreement or disagreement
between ideas, only the presumption of one, or the other.26 This is precisely why Locke takes the
presumption of zigure as mere ‘mark’ of figure, and he explicitly says judgments are quick to be
mistaken as perception.
Abandon Common Sensibles, or Judgment?
In Ralph Schumacher’s essay, ‘What Are The Direct Objects Of Sight?,’ he insists that
positing judgment to perceive figure would undermine Locke’s empiricist epistemology. As a
good empiricist, Locke holds that all simple ideas are received passively by the mind. Locke
compares the mind to a mirror, unable to refuse simple ideas, whether we want them or not.27
Locke explains ideas are immediate objects of perception, thought, or understanding.28
Vere Chappell notes that Locke uses the term idea indiscriminately, while those before
him had used different names for different designations.29 Therefore, a lot of confusion has
arisen in discussing Locke’s use of ideas, but what is clear is that they come in two flavors:
simple and complex.
Simple ideas for Locke either have a uniform appearance, or while being reflected upon
in the mind, cannot be conceived to break down into other ideas.30 Chappell suggests Locke
defines simple ideas in two sorts of ways, phenomenally, and logically. If an idea is perceived as
26
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a unity with no division in it, it is phenomenally simple, whereas, if an idea cannot be thought of
as containing another idea it is logically simple.31 Locke often invokes ideas of secondary
qualities—or the proper sensibles—as prime examples of simple ideas. In addition to simple
ideas, Locke also holds that there are complex ideas, which are also passively received. Chappell
explains, for Locke, ideas we acquire from sensation or reflection are the products of
compounding simple ideas. Ultimately, for Locke all the ideas we have can be abstracted in
reverse to simple ideas, which we passively receive.
Schumacher agrees with all the above regarding the passivity of receiving simple ideas.
Therefore, he argues that since the passivity of the mind ensures for Locke that simple ideas are
reliable signs of their external cause, any causal action by the mind—like judgment—in the
reception of these simple ideas would cast aside the reliability of their cause.32 Schumacher then
contends, rightly, that Locke rejects innate ideas of the mind. Any ideas produced by the mind
are complex ideas made out of simple ones. Thus, the Lockean mind cannot comprise the simple
idea of figure out of the simple ideas of colors. No simple ideas can be created out of other
simple ideas. With this in mind, Schumacher explains that if Locke’s use of the word ‘form,’ as
an action of a judgment, is to be taken to mean ‘alter’ or ‘change,’ then several difficulties
arise.33 The first is an altered idea cannot be a simple idea because part of the definition is simple
ideas cannot be altered. The second is that Schumacher thinks it is difficult to conceive of the
visual idea of figure as composed of various colors, since simple ideas have a uniform
appearance. Lastly, since Locke says this visual idea of figure is different from all other visual
31
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ideas, Schumacher reasons, Locke takes ‘form’ to mean ‘produce,’ which would clearly be in
conflict with Locke’s empiricism. 34 Schumacher, concludes, that while Locke’s use of judgment
makes his negative answer to Molyneux intelligible, it runs afoul central claims of his empiricist
epistemology, and it is for those coherence reasons that it should be jettisoned. Moreover Locke
should have given a positive answer to Molyneux given his commitments to the common
sensibles and that figure is a primary quality that resembles.35
I agree with much of Schumacher’s view. We agree that Locke cannot say figure is a
simple idea, while it is composed of other simple ideas like color. Where I disagree, is that Locke
takes the act of judgment to actually ‘produce’ the simple idea of figure. He specifically says that
it takes the ‘mark’ of figure. On my account—which I will explain more of below—the idea of
zigure that arises from the judgment occurs from the presumed agreement of ideas in the mind.
That is to say, Molyneux’s patient presumes the idea of a two-dimensional figure, variously
shaded, agrees with the idea of figure received by resemblance.
A Novel Interpretation
I will now weave together the core details above into a coherent account, which results in
an answer to the Molyneux question that allows Locke to adhere to his various philosophical
doctrines. By my lights, Molyneux’s patient upon regaining their sight, in the case of the sphere,
would see a variously shaded two-dimensional circle, contemporaneously, as they perceived a
three-dimensional figure. The idea of the two-dimensional circle is causally conveyed to a
person, while the representational content of figure, originally conveyed via the modality of
touch, via resemblance, would also be presented.
34
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Presumably, the idea of three-dimensional figure would be colorless in its representation,
since color is peculiar to the modality of sight. Perhaps, ideas of primary quality represent in the
mind as in Flemish painting, with multiple points of view, being perceived by someone suffering
from complete achromatopsia. Regardless of how an object is represented through resemblance it
seems reasonable to assume it would scarcely be taken noticed of relative to the colors that
enshroud the surface on an object. In the same way, with the modality of touch the simple idea of
heat searing ones flesh would take the lion’s share of one’s attention, rather than shape of the hot
rock felt.
The role of judgment, collecting the various colors in the idea of a circle forming an idea
of three-dimensional zigure, I take as entirely passive. On my view, the idea of two-dimensional
figure is be presumed to agree with the idea of three-dimensional figure, thus passing off the
appearance of zigure. It is strongly suggested Locke may have thought it was possible for
someone to presume the agreement without the aid of touch. But they would not be able to know
for certain until the object was touched.
This claim is consistent with Locke’s wording in response to Molyneux. Locke seems to
agree with Molyneux’s answer, but not necessarily with all of his reasoning. Locke explicitly
states he agrees with this thinking man, not the thinking of the man. Furthermore, Locke says
that at first a person would not be able to say for certain which was which, but could
unmistakably name them via touch.36
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It is helpful to note that Locke composed most of his essay while in Holland, during
exile. During his stay he frequented many art galleries.37 Locke explained that someone unskilled
in painting would not believe there were no ‘protuberances’ in the images they saw, unless they
touched the painting. An interesting point about judgment can be taken from this. The person
viewing the painting could not be certain that they did not perceive ideas of primary qualities in
the shapes of the objects, since the judgment presumed falsely an agreement between ideas of
secondary quality of two-dimensional shapes with those of primary qualities. This is precisely
why Locke takes ideas of secondary quality, such as colors, only to represent their causes, but
not bodies.
Concluding Remarks
What I have endeavored to show is that Locke need not abandon his doctrine of common
sensibles, or the resemblance of ideas of primary quality, or posit an over active judgment to
remain consistent in his answer to Molyneux. I take it within the scope of Locke’s philosophy
that visual input taken from colors is received two-dimensionally, and that we passively judge it
to agree with our ideas of three-dimensional figure received by resemblance. In other words, it is
within the pale of Locke’s philosophy to hold that there is an innate cross-modal faculty for
representational content of ideas of primary quality, but this content needs to be empirically
verified. This interpretation relies heavily on two theses. The first is that Locke held there was
kind of figure, which I have referred to as zigure. The second, and likely more controversial
claim, is that Locke came to believe that the mechanical philosophy of his day, either could not
epistemically account for the interaction of some bodies, or that it could not metaphysically
37
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account for this interaction. Regardless, it is clear that Locke came to hold that the conveyance of
information through the impulse between bodies is the only causal interaction understandable to
us, but there nonetheless were other casual modes of interaction.

